The Curious Incident of Attention in Multisensory Integration:Bottom-up vs. Top-down by MacAluso, Emiliano et al.
 
 
The Curious Incident of Attention in Multisensory
Integration
MacAluso, Emiliano; Noppeney, Uta; Talsma, Durk; Vercillo, Tiziana; Hartcher-O'Brien, Jess;
Adam, Ruth
DOI:
10.1163/22134808-00002528
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
MacAluso, E, Noppeney, U, Talsma, D, Vercillo, T, Hartcher-O'Brien, J & Adam, R 2016, 'The Curious Incident
of Attention in Multisensory Integration: Bottom-up vs. Top-down', Multisensory Research, vol. 29, no. 6-7, pp.
557-583. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-00002528
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Eligibility for repository: Checked on 27/9/2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
The Curious Incident of Attention in Multisensory Integration: Bottom-up vs. Top-
down 
  
Emiliano Macaluso1*, Uta Noppeney2*, Durk Talsma3*, Tiziana Vercillo4*, Jessica Hartcher-
O'Brien5$, Ruth Adam6$ 
  
1.  Neuroimaging Laboratory, Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome, Italy 
2.  Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics Centre, University of Birmingham, UK 
3.  Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B- 9000 Ghent, 
Belgium 
4.   Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA 
5.  Sorbonne Universites, UPMC Univ Paris, 06, UMR 7222, ISIR, F-75005, Paris, France 
6.  Institute for Stroke and Dementia Research, Klinikum der Universität München, Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität LMU, Munich, Germany 
  
*equal contribution (ordered alphabetically) 
$equal contribution 
  
Short title: Attention and Multisensory Integration 
 
 
  
  
  
Corresponding authors: 
Jessica Hartcher-O'Brien 
Institute of Intelligent Systems and Robotics 
University Pierre et Marie Curie 
4 Place Jussieu 
75005 Paris France 
Phone:+33 (0) 1 44 27 63 58 
Email: hartcher@isir.upmc.fr 
  
Ruth Adam 
Institute for Stroke and Dementia Research 
Klinikum der Universität München   
Feodor-Lynen-Straße 17 
D-81377 Munich 
Germany 
Phone: ++49 (0) 89 4400-46165   
Fax : ++49 (0) 89 4400-46114 
Email: Ruth.Adam@med.uni-muenchen.de 
  
Summary 
The role attention plays in our experience of a coherent, multisensory world is still 
controversial. On the one hand, a subset of inputs may be selected for detailed processing 
and multisensory integration in a top-down manner, i.e. guidance of multisensory integration 
by attention. On the other hand, stimuli may be integrated in a bottom-up fashion outside the 
focus of attention according to low-level properties such as spatial coincidence. Moreover, 
bottom-up attentional processes may also facilitate MSI. 
Moreover, attention itself is multifaceted and can be described via both top-down and 
bottom-up mechanisms. Thus, the interaction between attention and multisensory integration 
is complex and situation-dependent. The authors of this opinion paper are researchers who 
have contributed to this discussion from behavioural, computational and neuronal angles. 
We posed a series of questions, the goal of which was to illustrate the interplay between 
bottom-up and top-down processes in various multisensory scenarios in order to clarify the 
standpoint taken by each author and with the hope of reaching a consensus. Although 
divergence of viewpoint emerges in the current responses, there is also considerable 
overlap: In general, it can be concluded that the amount of influence that attention exerts on 
MSI depends on the current task as well as prior knowledge and expectations of the 
observer. Moreover stimulus properties such as the reliability and salience also determine 
how open the processing is to influences of attention. 
  
Keywords: Bayesian causal inference, Endogenous, Predictive coding, Salience, Stimulus-
driven 
 
  
Introduction 
The interplay between attention and multisensory integration (MSI) is a complex and 
controversial topic. This may be due, in part, to the fact that attention and MSI interact at 
multiple levels. Moreover, both attention and MSI are complex, multifaceted processes that 
contribute to the control of sensory processing and, ultimately, to behaviour. In the current 
context MSI is defined as the merging of information across two or more sensory modalities 
in order to obtain a coherent, robust percept. MSI describes the interaction between sensory 
signals: First, when sensory signals are redundant and second when there is sensory 
combination with non-redundant cues. Redundant  sensory signals arise from within the 
same coordinate system (e.g. both visual and auditory information can be transformed into 
craniotopic coordinates) and pertain to the same environmental property (e.g. Ernst & 
Banks, 2004), whereas, sensory combination refers to multisensory interactions for sensory 
signals that are not redundant, may be coded in different coordinate systems and have 
potentially different units (e.g. Hecht & Reiner, 2009). Both processes are referred to in the 
current discussion under the umbrella of MSI. Attention is primarily defined as a guiding 
process in which relevant inputs are being selected for detailed processing and perceptual 
awareness out of the inflow of all incoming information (Marois and Ivanoff, 2005, Talsma et 
al., 2010, Adam et al., 2014). Top-down, endogenous attention can be voluntarily allocated 
toward a stimulus, a sensory modality or a specific region of space in order to achieve task 
goals (Li et al., 2004; Wolfe, Butcher et al., 2003). Attention can also be involuntarily 
captured ‘bottom-up’ by external events, even though the attention capturing signals are 
unrelated to the current goal-directed activity (Öhman et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 2012; Wolfe 
et al., 2003). 
  
The neural mechanisms that underlie endogenous and stimulus-driven processes have been 
studied extensively in the visual modality. In the field of visuo-spatial attention control, a 
relatively straightforward view concerns the distinction between endogenous (internal) 
control in the dorsal fronto-parietal regions and stimulus-driven (external) control in the right 
ventral fronto-parietal network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). These two attentional control 
systems are thought to work together influencing the "responsiveness" of the occipital visual 
cortex (sensory modulation), e.g. by boosting the processing of visual stimuli at the attended 
location, and controlling the orienting of attention towards relevant and/or unexpected visual 
stimuli (Corbetta et al., 2008). Several imaging studies indicated that these two control 
systems also operate in situations involving non-visual stimuli. For example the dorsal 
fronto-parietal network has been found to be activated when subjects focused endogenous 
attention to discriminate either auditory or tactile targets (Hill and Miller, 2010; Yantis et al., 
2002; Macaluso et al., 2003; Krumbholz et al., 2008); while the ventral network was found to 
be activated when participants re-oriented attention to discriminate these targets presented 
at an unattended location (Macaluso et al., 2002b; Downar et al., 2000). The finding of 
modality independent responses in the fronto-parietal attention networks is consistent with 
supramodal mechanisms of attentional control (Farah et al., 1989; Macaluso and Driver, 
2005), which provides us with a first link between attention and the processing of 
multisensory stimuli. 
  
The interaction between MSI and attention has previously been explained both in terms of 
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms. According to the account of pre-attentive automatic 
integration, stimuli are integrated spontaneously at the early stage of processing and this 
integration itself may capture attention. The audio-visual ventriloquist illusion, in which a 
spatially discrepant sound is perceived to arise from the vicinity of a synchronous visual 
stimulus, exemplifies integration which is independent of both endogenous (Bertelson et al., 
2000) as well as exogenous unisensory attention (Vroomen et al., 2001b). This illusion 
further enhances spatial attention to speech sounds (Driver, 1996; though see Jack, O'Shea, 
Cottrell and Ritter 2013), again suggesting that multisensory binding has occurred 
automatically and before auditory attentive selection. Similarly, Van der Burg and colleagues 
(2008) have demonstrated that a sound decreases search times for a synchronized visual 
object and that detection accuracy is related to an early ERP component (Van der Burg et 
al., 2011), supporting the idea that the automatic integration of multisensory stimuli can 
recruit attention. Furthermore, sounds can capture visual attention in cases of limited 
resources as demonstrated with the attentional blink paradigm (Olivers and Van der Burg, 
2008). 
  
Alternatively, attention can limit or boost MSI, even at relatively early processing stages 
(Karns and Knight, 2009; Senkowski et al., 2005). Attending to an object feature in one 
modality can direct attention to another modality (Busse et al., 2005; Molholm et al, 2007) 
and the attentional focus of subjects affects the unisensory weights and extent of integration 
with e.g. multimodal attention as opposed to attending to a single modality, facilitating 
integration (Oruc et al., 2008; Vercillo and Gori, 2015). Also, high level processes such as 
task goals (Donohue et al., 2015) or prior knowledge (Adam and Noppeney, 2014) can 
enhance integration. On the other hand, the McGurk effect, an illusory auditory perception 
generated by incongruent audio-visual speech stimuli, is considerably reduced by a 
secondary task suggesting that the high attentional load reduces multisensory processing 
(Alsius et al., 2005; Alsius et al., 2007). 
  
At first sight, these current findings are not consistent and even appear contradictory. We 
have asked four researchers, Emiliano Macaluso, Uta Noppeney, Durk Talsma and Tiziana 
Vercillo, who have contributed to research in this field and participated in the IMRF 2015 
symposium “The Curious Incident of Attention in Multisensory Integration: Bottom-up and 
Top-down” to cast their opinions on this issue. Specifically, we have restricted the discussion 
to the role of attention on MSI and attention's modulatory elements in the non-chemical 
senses. 
  
The role of attention on MSI 
Questions 1. What kind of role does attention play in MSI and how much of this role 
can be accounted for by low-level perceptual processes and how much by top-down 
influences? 
  
TV: The relation between attention and MSI is complex and results from the interaction 
between the top-down attentional modulations of multisensory processing and the bottom-up 
attentional capture from automatically integrated multisensory inputs. Indeed, on the one 
hand concurrent sensory stimuli tend to be automatically integrated and processed to form a 
single coherent percept (Bertelson et al., 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001b) highlighting the 
importance of bottom-up processes for multisensory integration. On the other hand, several 
studies have reported top-down effects of attention on multisensory perception, for example 
factors such as the specific task, goal (Donohue et al., 2015) can enhance integration. 
Automatic MSI is not affected by attention (Bertelson et al., 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001b). It 
is fairly clear that attention and MSI affect each other, both at the level of behavioural 
outcome and neural processing as both MSI and attention the cognitive processes are 
characterized by multiple mechanisms that occur at different stage of processing. 
  
Recently, Talsma et al. (2010) proposed that the stimulus complexity of the environment, 
and particularly the on-going competition between the stimulus components within it, 
determines the nature and directionality of these interactions. For instance, these authors 
have suggested that MSI tends to occur automatically and pre-attentively. However, the 
modulatory effect of top-down attention seems to be required when multiple stimuli with low 
saliency within each modality are competing for processing resources. Another possibility is 
that attentional resources are required to integrate near threshold stimuli while the 
integration of supra-threshold stimuli may occur automatically and pre-attentively. 
  
EM: The lack of a detailed understanding of the many sub-processes involved in attention 
control and in MSI is a major obstacle for the understanding of the interactions between 
these two processes. Nonetheless, here I will attempt to provide a conceptual framework of 
where to place attention and MSI, and my answers will be within this framework. The basic 
notion is simple and well acknowledged in the attention literature: the external world 
stimulates the brain with a vast amount of sensory input and some mechanism(s) must 
decide to what extent each signal will be processed and, eventually, contribute to 
determining behaviour. Moreover, any such "decision" must take into account not only the 
external input, but also signals that are generated internally and that reflect information 
stored within the brain. In this framework we can draw a distinction between bottom-up 
stimulus-driven processes (i.e. related to the external input) and endogenous effects (i.e. 
related to information stored in the brain). 
  
In this framework one may consider any multisensory input as a source of stimulus-driven 
attentional control. That is, the presentation of any sensory input will always generate some 
stimulus-driven attentional signal, which can be linked to the activation of the sensory 
cortices responding to the stimulation. As noted in the introduction, endogenous attention 
also contributes to the activity of these regions (see also, Kastner et al. 1999) and, therefore, 
the level of activity in these sensory areas can be interpreted as the outcome of the 
combined effects of endogenous and stimulus-driven signalling. Concerning MSI, we may 
ask whether multisensory stimuli can influence activity within these early stages of 
processing or, rather, MSI requires that multisensory signals propagate extensively in the 
brain with interactions taking place in higher-level associative regions. 
  
We can think about two extreme examples. One case would involve the sensory input 
activating only relatively low-level sensory areas, without any effect on behaviour and no 
interactions between the two modalities in any area of the brain. I would argue that even in 
this condition the multisensory input is generating some stimulus-driven attentional control 
signal; that is, the signal represented within the sensory areas. However these signals do not 
travel much in the brain, for example because the subject is focusing voluntary attention to 
some other stimulus. The opposite case would involve situations when the interaction 
between the multisensory stimuli is so relevant that it ends up determining behaviour. This 
may involve conditions with near-threshold stimuli that can be detected only when attention 
is fully focused on the stimuli and where specific aspects of the multisensory stimuli (e.g. 
spatial and/or temporal alignment) determine what the subject perceives. In this case the 
sensory signals travel extensively in the brain, interacting with each other in many different 
brain regions, including low-level sensory areas and high-level associative areas involved in 
attentional selection, decision making and possibly motor control (e.g. Fairhall and 
Macaluso, 2009; Noppeney et al., 2010). I assume that in most experimental setup, as well 
as many everyday life situations, the degree of interaction between multisensory signals will 
be somewhere between these two extreme cases. This may involve MSI contributing to the 
allocation of processing resources, without fully governing subjective perception and 
behavior. This provides us with a vast range of possibilities to investigate the interplay 
between attention and MSI. 
  
But what would be the specific contribution of endogenous versus stimulus-driven signalling 
in any given multisensory situation? I believe that a major issue here is that, while it is 
relatively easy to experimentally manipulate any stimulus-driven effect (e.g. by changing the 
physical characteristics of the stimuli delivered to the subject), it can be difficult to firmly 
establish what endogenous signals may be associated with any specific experimental setup. 
One way to experimentally manipulate endogenous attention involves using dual task 
procedures, where one can change the load/difficulty of a primary task (e.g. a central 
discrimination task), while - at the same time - asking the participants to process some 
multisensory stimulation (Alsius et al., 2005; Santangelo et al., 2008, see also Zimmer and 
Macaluso, 2007). Studies using this approach have shown a variety of results, ranging from 
the modulation of behavioral effects under high-load conditions (Alsius et al., 2005) to no 
effect of load on multisensory processing (Zimmer and Macaluso, 2007). Many different 
factors may have contributed to these differences (see also Spence, 2010), but I believe that 
one point to notice is that it is very difficult to know what strategy the participants use in 
these dual task conditions. Participants may systematically prioritize one or another task, 
switch between tasks or attempt to perform the two tasks in parallel (see Fischer and 
Plessow, 2015 for a recent review on cognitive control during dual-task performance). 
Another situation that is likely to involve endogenous control to an extent that is difficult to 
monitor relates to the use of stimulus material tapping into pre-existing associations. 
Examples of this would include studies using audio-visual speech, or real objects and their 
associated sounds. The role of such "content/semantics-related" associations has been the 
target of many studies and it is well acknowledged in the MSI literature (Doehrmann and 
Naumer, 2008). Nonetheless, unlike other low-level stimulus characteristics (e.g. timing, 
position, etc.) these effects rely on pre-existing "internal knowledge" and it is difficult to 
exactly know whether/how the participants make use of this knowledge to strategically 
address and solve any specific task. 
  
UN: The extent to which attention influences MSI remains controversial. According to the 
account of pre-attentive automatic integration MSI increases the bottom-up stimulus 
saliency. This account is supported by a vast body of neurophysiological or imaging 
research demonstrating MSI in anaesthetized non-human primates (e.g. superior colliculus, 
primary sensory areas, e.g. Kayser et al., 2005; Stanford et al. 2005; Stein and Meredith, 
1993). It is also supported by psychophysics studies in humans suggesting that the 
ventriloquist illusion is immune to endogenous and exogenous spatial attention (Bertelson et 
al., 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001b) and induces a ‘pre-attentive’ mismatch negativity response 
(Stekelenburg et al., 2004) comparable to a truly displaced sound. Yet, despite this 
extensive evidence for automaticity of MSI, more recent studies have also revealed profound 
influences of attention on MSI. Thus, modality-specific attention was shown to alter the 
sensory weights in audio-visual integration (Vercillo and Gori, 2015 but see Helbig and 
Ernst, 2008). Moreover, the McGurk illusion falters when attention is diverted to a secondary task 
(Alsius et al., 2005; Munhall et al., 2009). Particularly, fMRI and EEG research in humans have 
highlighted attentional influences on MSI (Talsma et al., 2007; Talsma et al, 2010). Attention 
modulated the amplification of the BOLD response for congruent audio-visual (AV) speech signals in 
superior colliculi, primary sensory and association cortices (Fairhall et al., 2009). Similarly, in EEG 
AV interactions (e.g. saliency effects) were influenced by modality-specific (or spatial) attention 
already at ≤ 100 ms poststimulus (Talsma and Woldorff, 2005; Talsma et al., 2007). A concurrent 
visual signal presented in one hemifield induced a lateralization of auditory ERPs as a function of 
spatial attention (Donohue et al, 2011). 
  
Collectively, these seemingly contradicting results suggest a complex relationship between 
attention and MSI. Most likely, the role of attention in MSI depends on several factors such 
as the type of integration (e.g. stimulus salience vs. representation) and the cortical 
hierarchical level. For instance, MSI in primary sensory areas and superior colliculus may 
automatically integrate signals to increase their bottom-up salience which is critical for 
detection tasks. By contrast, attention is likely to play a critical role in higher order 
association areas where signals are predominantly integrated into multisensory 
representations (e.g. spatial or semantic representation that provide estimates to the where 
and what questions), which are important for estimation, discrimination or categorization 
tasks (Macaluso and Driver, 2005; Werner and Noppeney, 2010). 
In the following, I will explain how attention may influence this latter representational 
integration from the perspective of Bayesian causal inference (Koerding et al., 2007; Shams 
and Beierholm, 2010; Rohe and Noppeney, 2015 a,b). Bayesian causal inferences has 
recently been proposed as a normative model that describes how the brain should integrate 
and segregate sensory signals in the face of uncertainty about the causal structure of the 
world. Basically, the brain needs to solve two computational challenges: First, it needs to 
determine which signals emanate from a common source and should be integrated based on 
them co-occurring in time (e.g. temporal synchrony) and space (e.g. spatial coincidence). 
Second, it needs to integrate signals from a common source into a statistically optimal 
percept by weighting them in proportion to their reliabilities. Bayesian causal inference 
proposes that an ideal observer solves this problem by computing several perceptual 
estimates. More specifically, it computes perceptual estimates under the forced fusion (i.e. 
signals being caused by a common event) and full segregation assumptions (i.e. signals 
being caused by independent events) and finally combines these two estimates into a final 
so-called Bayesian causal inference estimate. 
Attention and task-relevance may influence this process via multiple mechanisms: 
First, attention may facilitate the segmentation of sensory inputs from background clutter and 
the abstraction of representations (e.g. spatial, phonological, semantic) from the unisensory 
inputs, which may be a critical prerequisite for representational integration across the senses 
(Olivers et al., 2008). For instance, in the McGurk illusion attention may enable the brain to 
extract phonological information from the visual facial movements (i.e. visemes) which can 
then in turn influence auditory speech recognition (Alsius et al., 2005). 
Second, modality-specific or spatial attention may increase the reliability of the attended 
auditory or visual inputs by reducing sensory noise via gain modulatory mechanisms. This 
will in turn change the relative weights of the sensory inputs when being integrated into a 
coherent percept. 
Third, the task-relevance of a sensory modality determines whether the forced fusion 
estimate is combined with the auditory or the visual full segregation estimate into the final 
Bayesian causal inference estimate. For instance, when sound location is attended and 
reported, the observer will combine the forced fusion audio-visual estimate with the auditory 
estimate under the assumption of full segregation. By contrast, when visual location is 
attended and reported, the observer will combine the forced fusion audio-visual estimate 
with the pure visual estimate under the assumption of full segregation. Collectively, this will 
lead to a different influence of the auditory or visual signal of the perceived stimulus location. 
In other words, because the brain combines the forced fusion estimate with the auditory 
estimate for auditory attention and with the visual estimate for visual attention, auditory and 
visual attention conditions will be associated with different estimates (see figure 1 for a 
graphical explanation). 
Fourth, modality-specific attention (e.g. report the location of the sound) may generally 
reduce participants’ prior assumptions that two signals are caused by a common source. As 
a consequence, the influence of the forced fusion estimate in their final Bayesian causal 
inference estimate is reduced. In other words, modality-specific attention will attenuate MSI 
and make participants rely more on the unisensory estimates (modality-specific attention 
may modify participants’ common source prior or expectations, which in turn influences their 
integration tendency, see figure 1). 
  
DT: There are probably at least two aspects relevant for addressing this question. The first 
concerns the question of how attention can influence sensory processing. The second 
concerns the question to what degree selective attention and MSI fulfil similar roles. Several 
lines of research that can be dated back to the 1970s have indicated that selective attention 
can influence sensory processes. For instance, event-related potential (ERP) studies on 
both auditory and visual perception have shown that attention modulates the on-going 
sensory processes at several processing stages, including relatively early stages of sensory 
analysis (Hink et al., 1977; Picton and Hillyard, 1974). For the visual modality, spatial 
selective attention has been found to enhance the relatively early latency P1 and N1 ERP 
components (Hillyard et al., 1998), suggesting that attention serves as a gain controller of 
early sensory processes. For the auditory modality, top-down selective attention has been 
found to affect either the early latency N1 component itself (Picton and Hillyard, 1974) or an 
early latency endogenous component that partially overlaps the N1 component, which was 
labelled “processing negativity” (Näätänen, 1982). Though the exact functional role of these 
ERP modulations has subsequently been debated (Luck et al., 1994), this work does 
indicate that attention can modulate early sensory processing, and thus contribute to 
enhancing perceptual clarity and reducing stimulus ambiguity. 
  
The question whether attention is related to MSI was first raised in the  early 21st century. 
The question of whether and how attention relates to MSI dates back a number of decades. 
For instance, Bertelson and colleagues (Bertelson et al., 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001a, b) 
have argued that selective attention does not influence the ventriloquist effect. Likewise, 
Driver (1996) argued that the enhancement of speech perception through lip reading is 
essentially a pre-attentive process. This notion has subsequently been challenged by 
several findings-. For instance Alsius and colleagues (2005) showed that the McGurk effect 
is sensitive to task-demands (i.e. top-down attention). Concurrently, we (Talsma and 
Woldorff, 2005) showed that top-down selective attention affected several event-related 
brain potentials related to multisensory processing. Although the former two studies show 
that attention can affect MSI, it should also be noted that (pre-attentive) multisensory 
interactions can also influence attentional processes. For instance, Van der Burg et al., 
(2008) demonstrated that spatially uninformative sounds could increase the saliency of 
visual stimuli in a visual search task. Taken together, these findings highlight that 
multisensory processing and attention interact in a complex multifaceted manner (Talsma et 
al., 2010). 
  
Although much research is still needed to elucidate the finer details, the interaction between 
attention and multisensory processing can possibly be explained by adopting the predictive 
coding framework (see Talsma, 2015, for a recent review). According to this framework 
stochastic models of the environment exist somewhere in the brain, which are updated on 
the basis of processed sensory information (see Klemen and Chambers, 2011 for a review). 
These stochastic models thus provide the brain areas lower in the sensory processing 
hierarchy with predictions that can adjust the processing of on-going sensory input. A strong 
mismatch between the prediction and the actual sensory input will then result in a major 
update of the internal model. Viewed within this context, the internal representation of our 
external environment is constantly updated on the basis of sensory input (i.e. through 
feedforward connections) and sensory processing is updated on the basis of predictions 
provided by these active representations (i.e. through feedback connections). We can 
therefore argue that feedback connections from the higher-order to the lower-order brain 
areas embody the causal structure of the external world while anatomical feedforward 
connections provide feedback regarding prediction errors to higher areas. Anatomical 
forward connections are thus functional feedback connections, and vice versa (Friston, 
2005). Prediction errors will then result in strong adjustments in the internal representation 
and thus in strong top-down functional feedforward (or anatomical feedback) signals. Seen 
this way, attention could be considered a form of predictive coding; a process that 
establishes an expectation of the moments in time when the relevant, to be integrated 
stimulus inputs are to arrive (Klemen and Chambers, 2011). 
 
Summary: We all agree that the interplay between attention and MSI is manifold and that 
there is large body of evidence for both bottom-up and top-down influences. The conclusion 
to this question is that the role attention plays in MSI is situation-dependent and definition-
dependent. First, before addressing the nature of the interactions between attention and 
MSI, a deeper understanding of each of these processes in isolation is required. Second, the 
observed interactions and contradictory findings can be explained by the considering the 
exact stimuli (e.g integration of near-threshold stimuli require attention), the task goals (e.g. 
semantic task will involve top-down attentional influences) as well as the exact brain region 
which is being investigated (e.g. brain regions which are lower at the cortical hierarchy will 
exhibit more bottom-up like processes) (Figure 2). Bayesian causal inference as well as 
predictive coding provide the computational framework to address the interplay between 
those two complex processes and additional experiments, especially those which will 
manipulate top-down attention, are still required. 
  
Modulatory factors 
Question 2. Does the role of attention in MSI change according to the encountered 
modalities, for example, that one modality will capture attention more than the 
others? 
  
TV: Yes, the role of attention in modulating MSI can be affected by the physical attributes of 
the sensory events. For example, the auditory modality can powerfully capture attention as 
compared to other sensory modalities. 
Yes, the role attention plays is specific to the situation. In the bottom-up capture of attention 
by multisensory stimuli, the physical properties of the sensory event can capture attention 
with different levels of intensity. Van der Burg and colleagues (2010) reported that auditory 
stimuli can improve visual target identification when presented synchronous with the visual 
stimulus, supporting the idea that the auditory modality can attract spatial attention in a 
bottom-up process. In the orthogonal cuing paradigm (Spence and Driver, 1994), where 
uninformative lateralized auditory or visual cues are followed by an unpredictable target, 
Mazza et al., (2007) found faster discriminations for visual targets following ipsilateral 
auditory, suggesting that peripheral auditory stimuli vigorously capture attention. On the 
other hand, further investigation revealed that the cuing effect, supposed to be an automatic 
and pre-attentive process, is apparently reduced when spatial attention is focused elsewhere 
(Santangelo et al., 2007; Spence, 2010; Van Der Lubbe and Postma, 2005) suggesting that 
exogenous orienting of spatial attention might act as a truly automatic mechanism only under 
certain specific circumstances (Santangelo and Spence, 2008). The top-down attentional 
modulation, as in the case of high perceptual load, can reduce the effect of multisensory 
stimuli on exogenous spatial attention. 
 
DT: Several influential biologically plausible theories, such as the framework developed by 
Corbetta and Shulman, (2002), propose that attention operates by modulating the sensitivity 
of neurons in perceptual areas. More direct evidence for such modulations has been 
provided using single cell recordings in nonhuman primates (Motter, 1993). MSI is – at least 
in part – believed to operate on the basis of superadditive nonlinear responses of specific 
neurons in the superior colliculus (Stein et al., 2005; but see Holmes, 2009). Interestingly, 
temporally and spatially aligned sensory inputs in different modalities have a higher 
likelihood to be favoured for further processing, and thus to capture an individual’s attention, 
than do stimuli that are not aligned (Driver, 1996; Stein et al., 2005; Van der Burg et al., 
2008). This indicates that attention tends to orient more easily towards sensory input that 
possesses multisensory properties. These results suggest that MSI and attention operate on 
the basis of similar modulatory principles that appear to regulate the firing rate of perceptual 
neurons. Although it is currently unknown how these modulatory processes generalize 
across modalities, results from cross-modal attention studies suggest that spatial attention 
tends to be directed in a modality coordinated fashion (Eimer and Driver, 2001; Koelewijn et 
al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2003; Spence and Driver, 1996; see Spence and Driver 2004 for 
a review).  
  
EM: Following my earlier proposal that MSI is part of the mechanism that determines the 
representation and the propagation of sensory signals in the brain, one way to address the 
issue of "modality specificity" is to consider the characteristics of the neural representations 
associated with the different modalities. These sensory representations will not only 
determine "what" about a given sensory input is registered in the brain, but will also 
constrain what type of multisensory interactions can take place. Each sensory modality is 
tuned to specific "features" and the corresponding sensory brain areas are organized 
specifically to process these features. Examples of this concern the existence of specialized 
areas to process colour in the visual cortex (Lueck et al., 1989) or the tonotopic organization 
of the auditory cortex (Langers et al., 2007). Such neural machinery specialized to process 
modality-specific features implies that stimulus-driven and endogenous signalling about a 
given feature can exist only in a subset of sensory modalities, which in turn will constrain 
possible crossmodal and attentional effects based on that feature. For example, Matuzu and 
colleagues (2015) showed that presenting an irrelevant red-shape together with the spoken 
word "red" can influence search performance, indicating that the semantic level audio-visual 
crossmodal correspondence can affect the deployment of spatial attention. While these 
effects will entail a strong contribution of endogenous signalling related to semantic 
knowledge, such effects must also rely on the visual brain processing colour information, so 
that this can interact with any information arising from the auditory modality. 
  
More subtle specificities may be expected when the crossmodal interactions involve spatial 
or temporal information. The precision to encode the location of the stimuli is higher for 
vision that for audition, while the opposite applies to the processing of temporal information 
(Recanzone, 2009). These differences can have an impact on how the two modalities 
interact with each other, generating various types of asymmetries in spatial/temporal 
attention and spatial/temporal judgment tasks. While, early behavioural studies suggested 
that visual or auditory non-predictive spatial cues can speed up responses to lateralized 
visual targets but not to auditory targets (e.g. Buchtel and Butter, 1988; Prime et al., 2008; 
Driver and Spence, 1998, for review), further investigation of these asymmetries 
demonstrated that specific aspects of the task - such as the relevance of spatial information - 
can crucially  determine whether specific crossmodal cueing effects do or do not occur (e.g. 
McDonald and Ward, 1999). The latter further highlights the role of secondary task-features 
and endogenous strategic factors in these seemly "purely" stimulus-driven paradigms (cf. 
interplay between endogenous and stimulus-driven signalling, above; see also Ward et al., 
2000). These differences in "modality specificity" have been formally accounted for by 
Bayesian models that weight the contribution of each modality to multisensory processing 
according to the reliability of the unisensory input (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Alais and Burr, 
2004). Nonetheless these models are primarily based on stimulus-driven characteristics of 
the sensory input, while as noted in the sections above, in most real-life situations 
knowledge and expectations are likely to play a relevant role. In the case of multisensory 
processing, expectations may refer to whether two unisensory input are caused by a single 
(multisensory) source or two separate unisensory sources. These aspects can be formally 
accounted for by models of "causal inference" (Shams and Beierholm, 2010) that have been 
recently applied both to behavioural and to neuroimaging data of audio-visual processing 
(Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a,b). 
  
In sum, the characteristics of the sensory representations of the different modalities in the 
brain are likely to play a major role in how multisensory signals interact with each other, as 
well as constraining any effect of these on mechanisms of attentional control. In a stimulus-
driven perspective, the representations of specific sensory features (e.g. color for vision) and 
the accuracy/precision of the sensory representations (e.g. spatial resolution) will determine 
what kind of multisensory interactions can take place and how the signals in the different 
modalities will be weighted upon multisensory stimulation (e.g. dominance of one or another 
modality). I believe that the characteristics of the sensory representations also contribute to 
shaping the connectivity between lower-level sensory areas and higher-level associative 
regions (e.g. the fronto-parietal attention systems), thus determining how signals propagate 
in the brain. In general, I expect a strong relationship between "how" a given signal is 
represented in the brain and the type of attentional effects that we may observe when that 
signal is presented as a component of a multisensory stimulus. 
  
UN: The role of attention will depend interactively on the sensory modality and the particular 
representation (e.g. spatial vs. phonological) that is being integrated. For instance, speech 
recognition relies predominantly on the auditory sense in everyday life, while lip reading 
plays only a facilitatory role in challenging situations such as a noisy pub. Hence, we would 
expect that the brain can fairly automatically extract phonological information from sound, 
but requires attentional resources to extract phonological information from lip movements 
(e.g. visemes). As a consequence attention to vision should be required for the McGurk 
illusion to occur. Indeed, Alsius et al. (2005) have demonstrated that the McGurk illusion 
falters when attention is diverted to a secondary task. By contrast, in everyday life spatial 
localization is usually more reliably performed by the visual than the auditory sense. We 
would therefore expect that the ventriloquist illusion (here: the bias of a spatially disparate 
visual signal on the perceived sound location) will be increased when participants are less 
attentive and would therefore automatically rely more on the visual senses. Indeed, 
unpublished anecdotal evidence from our lab seems to suggest that the ventriloquist illusion 
is enhanced when participants are less attentive. In conclusion, limited attentional resources 
during demanding tasks impact observers’ auditory percept differently in the McGurk and the 
Ventriloquist illusion. The ventriloquist illusion is increased, because participants will 
‘automatically’ rely more on their visual sense for spatial localization. By contrast, the 
McGurk illusion is decreased, because participants naturally rely more on their auditory 
sense for speech recognition. In other words, it is not the modality in itself that determines 
the role of attention in MSI. Instead, the role of attention depends jointly on the sensory 
modality and the particular representation that needs to be integrated. 
  
Summary: Yes, attentional capture depends on the encountered modalities. In general, 
stimuli capture attention (bottom-up processes) based on their physical properties such that 
temporal and/or spatial coincidence of inputs recruit  attention. The extent to which attention 
will be captured by each of the encountered modalities depends on the current task; each 
modality is tuned to and is more reliable for coding certain situations and properties of the 
environment. For example, spatial tasks will boost the importance of visual inputs whereas 
temporal tasks will increase the weight of auditory stimuli. These sensory predispositions 
and coding differences will affect the way the stimuli are being integrated and can be 
accounted for by Bayesian models. In cases of task-based top-down attentional selection, or 
when observers have pre-existing expectations regarding the cause of the multisensory 
stimuli, the effect of the physical properties on bottom-up attentional capture will be reduced. 
In addition, the neural representation of the properties of the environment/stimuli can shape 
the multisensory interactions for attentional control. 
 
3. How much does the effect of attention depend on the stimulus properties (from 
perceptual inputs such as motion-direction to complex semantic or linguistic 
information) 
  
TV: The characteristics of the environment apparently regulate the effect of attention on MSI 
with temporal and spatial coincidence facilitating integration. In general, sensory events 
presented close together, e.g. in time, are more likely to be bound together automatically 
and pre-attentively (Aller, et al., 2015). On the other hand, the importance of the such 
coincidence seems to be task dependent. Particularly, spatial proximity seems to be relevant 
in tasks involving spatial attention and requiring orienting responses (see Spence, 2013 for a 
review).  
However, the salience of the stimuli also plays an important role in MSI, where salient stimuli 
are usually linked together while competitive stimuli require an attentional modulation 
(Talsma et al., 2010). 
 
The attentional modulation of MSI is not only affected by the complexity of the environment, 
but also by the complexity of the stimulus. For instance, complex stimuli such as linguistic 
information seem to be much more sensitive to the top-down process of attentional 
modulation. Alsius et al. (2005) described that the McGurk illusion is considerably attenuated 
when participants have to perform a dual task paradigm. In support of the idea that attention 
has a strong effect on MSI of high level stimuli, Fairhall and Macaluso (2009) have recently 
found that spatial attention enhances BOLD response in different brain areas, such as the 
superior temporal sulcus, the visual cortex and the superior colliculus for audio-visual 
speech stimuli. Senkowski and colleagues (2008) have found that in a multisensory speech 
recognition task, where subjects are presented with competing audiovisual stimuli, the shift 
of visual spatial attention toward distractor stimuli interferes with speech recognition 
performance. These results support the hypothesis that attention modulates the processing 
of multisensory speech stimuli. However, it is unclear whether is the complexity of the task or 
of the stimulus itself to determine the attentional regulation of MSI. 
  
DT: Traditionally, the literature has been divided between studies using relatively simple 
stimuli, such as beeps and flashes on the one hand, and more complex, meaningful stimuli 
on the other. Studies using simple, abstract stimuli have predominantly focused on 
determining stimulus-driven effects, such as their relative timing or location (Noesselt et al., 
2010; Stein and Stanford, 2008; van Wassenhove et al., 2007) or their relative intensity 
(Holmes, 2009; Rach, Diederich and Colonius, 2010) on multisensory processing. 
Furthermore the intrinsic processing capacities of each individual sensory system (Vatakis 
and Spence, 2007; Welch and Warren, 1980) have been identified to contribute to 
multisensory processing. The simultaneous and congruent stimulation of two or more senses 
has been shown to result in increases in brain activity (Calvert et al., 2000; Fairhall and 
Macaluso, 2009), increased physiological signals from brain areas responding to these 
stimuli (Molholm et al., 2002), better performance on stimulus identification tasks (Stein, 
London, Wilkinson and Price, 1996), or greater selectivity of relevant stimulus material 
(Staufenbiel et al., 2011; Van der Burg et al., 2008; 2011). Behavioural and event-related 
potential (ERP) studies have shown that an object that is simultaneously detected by several 
sensory systems has a greater potential for capturing one’s attention (Spence, 2010; Van 
der Burg et al., 2008; Van der Burg et al., 2011). This further suggests that when a sensory 
modality is processing a stimulus simultaneously with one presented to another modality, 
these concurrently presented stimuli have a natural tendency to be processed in greater 
depth than stimuli that are either non-concurrent in time. Taken together, these results 
suggest that stimulus driven (or bottom-up) processes have a major influence on 
multisensory processing. 
  
It should be stressed, however, that the results discussed above only reflect a small subset 
of multisensory processing results, namely the ones that have been obtained under 
conditions where there is relatively little competition for processing resources. Studies using 
more naturalistic, meaningful stimuli, such as speech fragments and movie clips have 
indicated that semantic congruence (Cappe et al., 2012; McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; 
Tuomainen et al., 2005) between visual and auditory stimuli also strongly influences 
multisensory processing. On the basis of the latter studies, it has been argued that audio-
visual speech perception is a special form of multisensory processing (Tuomainen et al., 
2005; Vatakis et al, 2008; ) (cf. Vroomen and Stekelenburg, 2011). Given the wide range of 
discrepancies between these different approaches in multisensory speech perception, 
however, it remains to be seen whether that is really the case. Regardless, however, the 
vastly different sets of results that have been obtained using these simple vs. complex 
stimuli indicate that the type of stimulus involved in multisensory processing does affect MSI. 
  
EM: Above, I suggested that the stimulus properties, or better "how" the stimulus properties 
are represented in the brain, ought to be a major determinant of crossmodal interactions in 
attention control. However, one should also consider other situations, where attention may 
work in a supramodal manner, irrespective of the specific sensory characteristics of the 
input. One example of this entails the integration of spatial representations across 
modalities. In a set of imaging experiments (Macaluso et al., 2002a; Macaluso et al., 2003), 
we asked participants to direct voluntary attention to one side of space and to discriminate 
either visual or tactile targets on the attended side. When vision was the relevant modality 
we found the expected "within-modality" effect of spatial attention, with activation of the 
regions of the visual occipital cortex that represent the attended visual hemifield. However, 
activity in the same regions also increased when the subjects attended to touch on the same 
side, indicating that the task-related endogenous signal modulating the response in these 
visual regions conveyed information about the relevant side/location irrespective of the 
specific modality to be judged (see Eimer, 2001, for a review of related effects in ERPs). 
These effects suggest that the interplay between attention and multisensory processing 
enables integrating spatial information across anatomically separated representations of 
external space (see Macaluso and Driver, 2005). Thus, crossmodal integration may not 
operate only to "bind" redundant sensory signals, but supramodal mechanisms of attentional 
selection can also integrate how "abstract" spatial information is represented in the brain 
(see also Macaluso et al., 2003; for relevant crossmodal effects in preparatory attention, i.e. 
in the absence of any sensory input). 
  
UN: The role of attention will depend on the complexity of the sensory signals, the context in 
which they are presented and the representation to be integrated. For instance, when 
auditory signals are presented in complex multi-tone masks during informational masking, 
attention will then play a critical role to segregate the auditory signal from the complex 
scene, which is a necessary precondition for it to be integrated with signals other sensory 
modalities. In these cases, attention is critical even for low-level integration processes that 
amplify stimulus salience and facilitate detection (Olivers et al., 2008, Giani et al., 2015). For 
stimuli that are more easily segmented from sensory noise, low-level MSI processes based 
on temporal coincidence may be more automatic. For instance, we observed activation 
increases in primary sensory areas for synchronous relative to asynchronous stimuli 
irrespective of task-context. These low level synchrony effects propagated then into higher 
order motion and shape areas depending on the attentional context, i.e. whether participants 
focused on the motion or shape properties of the stimuli. These results suggest that low level 
temporal properties of the stimuli may determine MSI in a more automatic fashion, while 
higher order representational integration (e.g. motion, shape) may be more sensitive to top-
down effects (Lee and Noppeney, 2014; Lewis and Noppeney, 2010). 
 
Summary: The stimulus properties indeed affect the observed interplay between MSI and 
attention. Temporally- or spatially-coincide simple stimuli will induce stimulus-driven, bottom-
up influences on attention while complex linguistic and semantic inputs will affect MSI via 
top-down attentional control mechanisms. However, it is important to note that stimulus 
complexity cannot be separated from the complexity of the task and the environment. An 
environment in which the stimuli are easily discriminated from noise will induce bottom-up 
effects. A task which directs attention to multiple stimuli can induce top-down effects 
irrespective of the presented stimuli.  
 
Conclusion 
In the current discussion we have attempted to characterize the role of attention on MSI to 
indicate how much of sensory integration can be accounted for by bottom-up stimulus driven 
factors and how much by top-down processes such as semantic, contextual, and dual task 
components (Fig. 1). The amount of influence that attention exerts on MSI depends on the 
task and the goal of the organism, and the predictions and expectations about the 
encountered stimuli. Moreover stimulus factors such as the reliability (i.e. the inverse of the 
variability in response to the stimulus) of a stimulus and its salience also determine how 
open the processing is to influences of attention. Computational models are useful for 
explaining such intertwined interactions, e.g. Bayesian Causal Inference. A further important 
consideration would be to observe multisensory-attention interactions in both well-controlled 
experiments and more naturalistic settings. We all agree that the interaction between MSI 
and attention remains a complex issue which requires further investigation. In the following, 
the final statements of each author as outlined in the discussion will be summarised. 
  
TV: Both bottom-up and top-down processes drive integration depending primarily on the 
structure of the stimuli, i.e. complex or simple; salience or near-threshold. Top-down 
attention seems to facilitate integration when multiple stimuli with low saliency within each 
modality are competing for processing resources, or in case of near-threshold stimuli. 
Moreover, spatial attention reduces pre-attentive MSI effects. The integration of supra-
threshold stimuli may, however, occur automatically and pre-attentively. 
  
UN: Attention affects MSI at multiple processing stages and cortical hierarchical levels. First, 
it enables different signals coming from a common source to be segmented from clutter and 
background noise in order to be integrated. Second, attention may increase the bottom-up 
salience and sensory reliability. Third, from the perspective of Bayesian causal inference, the 
task-relevance of a sensory modality influences whether the forced fusion estimate is 
combined with the full segregation of auditory or visual estimates. Finally, multisensory 
attention may influence participants’ tendency to integrate or segregate sensory signals by 
modulating their prior assumptions of two signals coming from a common source. 
Conversely, MSI automatically enhances the bottom-up salience thereby enabling sensory 
signals to grasp participants’ attention. 
  
DT: Both MSI and attention modulate the firing rate of perceptual neurons. The predictive 
coding framework can be used to explain the interaction between MSI and attentional 
control: attention helps us to shape our expectations regarding the environment and 
modulates integration accordingly. 
  
EM: I believe that the complexity of the mechanisms controlling the allocation of processing 
resources makes it difficult to  it is probably too early days to provide a comprehensive 
answer the question about the role of attention in MSI. My personal perspective is that the 
two processes should not be seen as separate entities, but rather they should be considered 
within a single framework: that of stimulus-driven versus endogenous signalling for the 
selection of relevant information and control of overt behaviour. This puts the emphasis on 
understanding the neural mechanisms associated with the processing of multisensory stimuli 
and how multisensory signals propagate in the brain. The latter will be determined by the 
type of sensory feature representation, as well as by prior knowledge and goals. The 
development of new theoretical and mathematical approaches (e.g. Bayesian causal 
inference, Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a) will help us with the interpretation of these neuronal 
effects. In addition, I believe that together with sophisticated and well-controlled 
experiments, it is important to look also into more naturalistic and life-like multisensory 
conditions. These could reveal aspects of multisensory processing and attentional control 
that may be concealed in standard experimental paradigms. In particular, I think to the role 
of endogenous signals associated with prior knowledge and expectations. These are likely to 
play a major role in everyday life situations and may differ from any task-related, strategic 
signals that characterize standard experiments in the laboratory. 
  
Summary 
The question and answer format of the current paper was designed to allow different 
perspectives on attention's role in MSI to be brought together. The aim was to provide 
insights into whether and how bottom-up factors or top-down modulation characterised the 
interaction between attention and MSI. While the interaction between MSI and attention has 
previously been explained in terms of both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms, two 
primary components emerged from the current discussion as characterizing the outcome of 
attentional influences on MSI: context (including observer goal, task and environmental 
properties), and priors i.e., the knowledge and expectations that the observer has built over 
development  about the current stimuli and their causes. Bottom-up factors emerged more 
weakly in the current discussion, but include concurrent multisensory inputs as attention 
facilitating in and of themselves, and stimulus properties, such as the reliability of the stimuli 
themselves. But how do these factors change our understanding of the role of attention in 
MSI? We would suggest that the relative sensitivity of MSI to attentional control depends 
upon the robustness of the sensory features to noise and perturbations in neural processing. 
When we consider the context related factors we are directly talking about how the patterns 
and features of the environment (stimulus properties) are coded by the brain as a function of 
past behavioural success (goal of the observer given the inputs) that then build an 
observer's 'priors'. That is, in the case of the audio-visual ventriloquist effect, the audio-visual 
stimulus combination experienced by the observer is integrated because audiovisual signals 
are often emitted by a single event (prevalent pattern inherent in our environment) in a 
manner robust to attentional manipulations. Moreover, the magnitude of the observed 
'mislocalization of the sound source' depends on how noisy each sensory input is. But the 
overall probability of integration, in the absence of attentional manipulations can also be due 
to priors: i.e. the previous behavioural success and meaning associated with the current 
context (see Purves et al., 2010). The history of behavioural success given the context is 
what informs the observers' priors. From this example it is easy to see that a number of 
factors determine the amount of influence attention has on MSI. As the context and 
goal/reward of the observer change, so  does the role of attention in MSI.  
 
 
  
Future directions 
1.  Does the influence of attention on sensory processing differ for 
multisensory vs. multiple unisensory inputs? 
2.  What neuronal networks promote the interplay between attention 
and MSI? 
3.     Which computation models can best explain the interaction 
between attention and multisensory integration? 
4.     How much learning is involved in shaping the role of attention in 
MSI? 
5.     Can we generalize from the known role of attention in MSI to 
other cognitive phenomenon such as emotion and 
awareness/consciousness? 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 
The role of attention in multisensory integration and segregation from the perspective 
ofBayesian Causal Inference. Given the uncertainty about the causal structure of the 
world the observer may compute a full segregation estimate under the assumption of 
independent sources and a forced fusion estimate under the assumption of one 
common source. The final Bayesian Causal Inference estimate takes into account the 
uncertainty about the causal structure of the world by averaging the task-relevant unisensory 
auditory (SA) and visual (SV) estimates under full segregation (C = 2) with the forced-fusion 
estimate (SAV) under full integration (C = 1),  weighted by the posterior probability of each 
causal structure  (for a common source: p(C = 1|xA, xV); and for independent sources: 1 − p(C = 
1|xA, xV). 
  
Figure 2 
The various factors which influence the interplay between multisensory integration 
and attention.The bidirectional influence of multisensory integration and attention is 
determined by the input, task at hand and cognitive state. 
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